35 years ago, on February 15, 1989, Moscow withdrew its troops from the conflict-ridden Central Asian country
Photo: The end of the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (now the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan). Solemn meeting of soldiers in the Turkmen SSR. © Sputnik / Sputnik
A war that shouldn’t have happened: How the USSR made its worst-ever mistake
RT | 15 February 2024
On February 15, 1989, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov crossed the bridge over the Amu Darya River between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, which was then part of the USSR. While crossing the river, Gromov uttered the historic phrase: “There is not a single Soviet soldier left behind me.”
That marked the end of the nine-year Soviet-Afghan War. This conflict is often considered part of the Cold War between the USSR and the US. However, the Soviet intervention cannot be properly assessed without understanding the political situation in the Central Asian country, at the time.
Prerequisites for the invasion
For a long time, Afghanistan had been an afterthought. In the 1970s, however, the political situation became troublesome. In 1973, the monarchy collapsed as a result of a coup, and was replaced by a short-lived republic. The Soviet Union initially had friendly relations with local elites, but then, Moscow got involved in their politics. Two political sides fought for power in Afghanistan: the leftist parties – supported by the Soviet Union – and the Islamic fundamentalists.
In 1978, dictator Mohammad Daoud Khan was removed from power during a coup d’état. He was overthrown by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) – a Marxist-Leninist political party that was oriented towards the Soviet Union.
Officially, the USSR supported the revolution, but in reality Moscow had mixed feelings about the situation in Afghanistan. Even Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev was caught off-guard by the coup. Moreover, the PDPA split into several factions which fought against each other, and its members treated the teachings of Karl Marx with the fervor of neophytes.
Afghanistan was one of the poorest and most archaic nations in the world. The PDPA’s leaders were enthusiastic about implementing reforms and changing this situation. However, even the most reasonable reforms were carried out in an aggressive and uncompromising manner, and the party made many enemies. Anyone who disagreed with them was imprisoned.
As a result, by 1979, a civil war had broken out. The government asked the USSR to provide a small army contingent to help maintain security in the capital city, Kabul. The KGB’s “Zenit” special forces unit and a paratrooper battalion were sent to Afghanistan. But soon, the situation in the country escalated further. The leader of the PDPA party, Nur Muhammad Taraki, and his confidant Hafizullah Amin got into a conflict that ended in another coup. Amin overthrew Taraki, killed him, and declared himself the head of Afghanistan and chairman of the PDPA.
Moscow’s reaction to this radical step was highly negative. Taraki was a personal friend of Brezhnev. Moreover, Amin did not want to “put all the eggs in one basket,” and started negotiations with the US.
The Soviet leaders saw this as betrayal. According to Cold War logic, if Afghanistan were to join the camp of US allies, that would pose a threat to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Amin purposefully made unfriendly remarks about the country’s Soviet partners, and the armed opposition gradually expanded its area of control in the country.
Big mistake
In December 1979, Moscow made one of the worst decisions in the history of the USSR: it decided to send troops into Afghanistan and eliminate Amin. The Soviet Union had already carried out successful military interventions, which weren’t met with serious local resistance. The difficulties of the operation in Afghanistan were underestimated. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would help overthrow the government and replace it with a more reliable and friendly one, and then would help the Afghan army stabilize the situation in the country.
On December 27, 1979, a daring military operation was carried out in Kabul. KGB special forces units, a detachment of airborne troops, and a special forces battalion of the Soviet army made up of fighters from the Central Asian republics of the USSR broke into Amin’s residence, neutralized his armed guards, and killed him. At the same time, Kabul was seized. At the time, the Afghans didn’t pay much attention to what was happening – for them, it was just another coup.
