The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was Russia’s attempts to build an alliance between former Soviet states after the Soviet collapse in 1991
Photo: Flag of Collective Security Treaty Organization (cropped)
25 March 2022 | James Porteous | Clipper Media News
Op-ed: What If Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Partners Intervene in Ukraine?
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is an organization that is determined to play an important role in European and Central Asian security. At present, six countries hold membership in the Organization: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization
No Date | John P. Ruehl | Indepth News
WASHINGTON, D.C. (IDN) — Russia’s attempts to build an alliance between former Soviet states began shortly after the Soviet collapse in 1991.This led to the signing of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), which came into effect in 1994, by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Designed to coordinate military policies and collective defense between member states, the CST failed to promote any real military integration, and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan chose to leave in 1999, during the renewal of the treaty.
When Vladimir Putin took over as president of Russia, he placed considerable efforts into expanding post-Soviet military ties. In 2002, the Collective Security Treaty was granted the status of an “international regional organization,” and came to be known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The Russian-led CSTO alliance saw increased common military drills, and a Collective Rapid Reaction Force—“designed to respond quickly to the challenges and threats to the security of the CSTO member states”—and a joint air defense system were also created. Russia’s defense industry also increased weapons exports and maintenance deals with the CSTO member states.
Yet until 2022, the CSTO had been slow to reveal any tangible use to any of its members besides Russia. Kyrgyzstan appealed to the CSTO to help end ethnic clashes in the country in June 2010, but the organization denied the request as it lacked the mandate to intervene in the “domestic affairs” of member states (a limitation since lifted after the CSTO decided to send forces into Kazakhstan in January 2022 to put an end to the unrest in the country).
In September 2010, the CSTO also refrained from intervening to help Tajikistan suppress rising militancy in the country. And in 2021, Tajikistan’s leadership complained about the CSTO’s lack of assistance as U.S. troops pulled out of neighboring Afghanistan. Instead, military drills were held by Tajikistan, Russia and non-CSTO member Uzbekistan at the border Tajikistan shares with Afghanistan in 2021—a couple of months before the CSTO conducted its own “counterterrorism drills” in Tajikistan.
Armenia has repeatedly appealed for CSTO assistance during its long-term dispute with Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, notably during their 2020 conflict, to no avail.
However, the CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan on January 5, 2022, proved that the alliance could provide benefits to other members besides Russia. As the Kazakh leadership faced nationwide protests and riots, 2,500 CSTO troops were sent in to secure Kazakhstan’s critical infrastructure. This allowed Kazakh security forces to focus their efforts on restoring order, and the Russian-led CSTO intervention successfully left a week later.
A CSTO intervention in Ukraine during the current Russia-Ukraine war would be a completely different operation than the one seen in Kazakhstan. Yet such a scenario was hinted at in 2014, shortly after the first Russian military intervention against Ukraine, by then-CSTO Secretary-General Nikolay Bordyuzha. He suggested that the CSTO’s peacekeeping forces were ready “for any operations outside its territories, including in Ukraine, but a decision for a peacekeeping mission would depend on the organization’s members.”
On February 19, meanwhile, just days before Russia recognized the independence of two breakaway regions in Ukraine, Luhansk and Donetsk, current CSTO Secretary-General Stanislav Zas stated that CSTO peacekeepers could be sent to the Donbas region under a UN mandate and with Kyiv’s blessing to help de-escalate the conflict in Ukraine. A few weeks later, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov stated that Putin intended to “involve representatives of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization” in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in some capacity.
It is still unclear what exactly a CSTO operation in Ukraine would look like. As of this moment, member states could be committing to an active war zone outside CSTO territory with little comparative experience compared to Ukrainian, Russian and proxy forces. Initially, CSTO operations in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict could likely be limited to the playbook seen in Kazakhstan and could only involve securing critical infrastructure and perhaps patrolling pacified regions.
Note: This article was produced by Globetrotter. John P. Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C. He is a contributing editor to Strategic Policy and a contributor to several other foreign affairs publications.
Debate on Cooperation Between the UN and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
15 February 2022 | What’s In Blue
About What’s In Blue
When the Security Council approaches the final stage of negotiating a draft resolution, the text is printed in blue. What’s In Blue is a series of insights on evolving Security Council actions designed to help interested UN readers keep up with what might soon be “in blue”.
Tomorrow (16 February), the Security Council will hold a debate on cooperation between the UN and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). UN Secretary-General António Guterres and CSTO Secretary-General Stanislav Zas are expected to brief. Russia, a founding member of the CSTO, is organising the debate as a signature event of its February presidency, and its Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov will chair the meeting.
The remaining CSTO member states—Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—have been invited to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
Tomorrow’s debate will be the third meeting on the CSTO organised by Russia in recent years. On 28 October 2016, the Council held a debate on cooperation between the UN and the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On 25 September 2019, the Council held a ministerial-level debate on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations, with a focus on the role played by the CSTO, the SCO, and the CIS in countering terrorist threats. Each of these debates took place while Russia was Council president.
The CSTO originated from the Collective Security Treaty, which was signed on 15 May 1992 following the fall of the Soviet Union. According to the CSTO charter, its goals are “strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, protection of independence on a collective basis, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states”.
Moscow has circulated a background paper ahead of tomorrow’s debate. It describes the history and purpose of the CSTO and outlines the framework that governs cooperation between the UN and the CSTO, including the General Assembly’s biannual resolutions on UN and CSTO cooperation and the 18 March 2010 joint declaration on cooperation between the organisations’ respective secretariats. It further notes that UN-CSTO cooperation has been developing on several different tracks, including peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, and drug trafficking, and invites member states to “present their vision of ways to strengthen security in the greater Eurasian region using existing regional mechanisms such as CSTO”.
Council members are divided in relation to the CSTO. Some members—including the UK and the US—are apparently sceptical of the organisation’s motives and regard it as a vehicle for spreading Russian influence throughout the region.
During the 28 October 2016 debate, for example, the US argued that “regional organisations are strongest when they reflect the goals and aspirations of all their members, rather than the dominance of a few” and said that organisations where “one or two states set the agenda” are not “truly regional”. Russia, on the other hand, is strongly supportive of the CSTO and regularly advocates for greater cooperation between the organisation and the UN. At the 28 October 2016 debate, Moscow described the CSTO as “truly vital” to the region and suggested that the UN and the CSTO should enhance their practical cooperation, particularly in relation to peacekeeping, combating organised crime and terrorism. These divisions may be reflected in Council members’ statements tomorrow.
The CSTO’s peacekeeping activities are expected to be discussed during tomorrow’s meeting. According to Russia’s background paper, the CSTO has been undertaking “intensive work” to develop its peacekeeping capacity with a view to contributing to UN peacekeeping operations.
The paper says that the CSTO has appointed a special representative for peacekeeping and established a joint working group with the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS) to facilitate dialogue regarding potential CSTO contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. It also refers to the “peacekeeping role of the CSTO in stabilising the situation in [Kazakhstan] during terrorist attacks and armed riots in January 2022” and says that CSTO troops completed their mission in Kazakhstan on time and without incident.
